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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property
insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of
exercise is the Claims / Premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased
results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to
claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across
time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error.
We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the
model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that
the public insurance providers are about 20 per cent more cost efficient than their private
counterparts.
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 1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost e¢ciency of private and
public insurance providers on the Swiss property insurance market. The
most commonly used indicator to perform this kind of comparison is the
claims-premium ratio (C/P ratio, see e.g. Association of British Insurers
[1996], Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance [1998] and UNESPA
[1994]), i.e. the percentage of premium revenue that the insurer spends on
claims payments. The higher this percentage is, the lower the fraction the
insurer needs for other purposes such as administrative costs, commissions
, reserves or pro…ts. The main advantage of this ratio is its simplicity. It
does, however, have a number of drawbacks. First, insurance contracts of
small value (e.g. travel luggage insurance) typically require much higher
sales and administrative costs per unit insured than contracts where the
sum insured is large1 (e.g. property insurance). This implies that, even
for e¢cient …rms, the C/P ratio should vary across insurance products, and
hence simple comparison across segments of the industry is not warranted.
Second, even within a given type of insurance contract there is no a priori
reason why the premium level should increase proportionately with claims.
For the problem we wish to address in this paper, this is an empirically
important issue. Indeed, on the Swiss property insurance market the private
suppliers have average claims levels that are roughly 50% higher than those
of the public insurance providers.
At a conceptual level, one can convincingly argue that the elasticity of
premiums with respect to claims should be less than unity. To illustrate this
we decompose the use made of the premium income of an insurance com-
pany into the following three components: a) claims payments, b) reserves
and pro…ts and c) administrative costs and commissions. This last compo-
nent is the most illustrative for our point. As regards the commissions paid
to the insurance brokers, there is no good reason why these should increase
with claims payments. Quite to the contrary, the e¤ort of an insurance bro-
ker is, as a …rst approximation, independent of the level of claims. One might
be tempted to go even further and argue that there should be a negative re-
lationship, as the insurance provider has an incentive to attract “good risks”.
Similarly, the administrative costs of an insurance company can be decom-
posed into two parts: …rst the cost of acquiring customers, which should be
1Average C/P ratios for private insurers in Switzerland in the years 1989 to 1994,
were 0.49 for legal protection and 0.74 for comprehensive insurance for airplanes, i.e. a
di¤erence of 25 percentage points.
2independent of the claims level; and second the cost of settling claims, which
should increase with the number of claims and presumably decrease with
the average size of each claim. These considerations would seem to indicate
that a simple linear regression of the level of premiums on the level of claims
should have a positive intercept and hence the C/P ratio would vary with
the level of claims.
A further issue is that, for many types of insurance, the level of claims
can ‡uctuate substantially from one year to the next. However, it is quite
intuitive that the insurance company’s actions (e.g. the sta¤ it employs
for settling claims and its administrative infrastructure), are a function of
the “normal” or “permanent” level of claims payments. Observed payments
can be considered as a noisy signal of this “permanent” level. This raises
a methodological problem. If we were to regress annual premium rates on
annual claims rates, we would obtain a slope coe¢cient with a strong down-
ward bias, because of measurement error problems. A number of authors
(Kirchgässner [1996], Schips [1995] and von Ungern-Sternberg [1994]) have
therefore decided to work with ten-year averages rather than annual data.
Actually Schips [1995] goes even further, stating that at least ten-year av-
erages need to be taken into account. The use of ten-year averages should
reduce the importance of the problems noted above, but not eliminate them.
The ten-year average, while being a more precise signal of the underlying
level of “permanent” claims, is still a noisy signal. One way to solve this
problem would be to resort to Instrumental Variables (IV) techniques.
Note that working with IV does not make use of all the information con-
tained in the data. Speci…cally, it could be the case that for some insurance
companies the variability of claims payments is much greater than for others.
It should be possible to use this information to obtain a more precise esti-
mator of the relationship between administrative costs and “normal” claims
payments.
We propose to empirically test these issues using data on 19 regionally
separated housing insurance markets (cantons) in Switzerland. Each of these
markets corresponds to a state owned monopoly (the Cantonal Property In-
surance, CPI) with perfectly inelastic demand, since housing insurance is
compulsory. We will develop unbiased estimators of the relationship between
administrative costs and claims payments on one hand, and premium income
and claims payments on the other. As regards premium income, a further
distinction will be introduced: The Cantonal Property Insurances spend a
large part of their premium income to …nance prevention (…re…ghting). We
3will thus distinguish between gross premiums (including expenditures on pre-
vention) and net premiums (net of expenditures on prevention).
We will use the estimates we obtain to compare the cost e¢ciency of the
Cantonal Property Insurances with the private insurance providers active
in the 7 Cantons that have no state monopoly provider. We come to the
conclusion that the cantonal property insurance providers are approximately
20% less expensive than their private counter parts, even if we consider that
the di¤erence in claims rates is exogenous. This fraction is considerably
larger than the result from the simple comparison of the C/P ratio.
From a methodological point of view, our paper can be seen as a contri-
bution to the (large) literature on measurement error in economics, much of
which has been developed around the topic of permanent income (e.g. Abul
Naga [2000] on intergenerational mobility). The novelty of our work is the
fact that we explicitly use the information we have on the degree of noisiness
of the observed signal to obtain a more e¢cient estimator. This has, to our
knowledge, not been done in the literature so far.
The issue of cost e¢ciency of property insurance providers has been taken
up by several authors. Regarding the Swiss market there has been an aca-
demic discussion in the middle of the 1990’s by Schips [1995], von Ungern-
Sternberg [1994, 1995] and Kirchgässner [1996]. Von Ungern-Sternberg took
the stand for the public …rms, arguing that they produced similar quality of
service but at a signi…cantly lower premium rate. Schips in turn took the
stand of the private …rms, claiming that relative to the observed damage
payments the public monopolies had a higher mark-up. Finally, the third
contributor to this academic discussion, Kirchgässner, rather favoured the
arguments of von Ungern-Sternberg. It is interesting to note that all three
authors were interested in the relationship between the level of claims pay-
ments and components of costs or premium levels, but reached contradictory
results.
Further, it is useful to mention two other studies concerning the German
housing insurance market, which experienced an opening of monopoly mar-
kets to competition. Felder [1996] compares the price-performance of public
monopolies and private …rms in Germany. He …nds that the monopoly …rms
have on average signi…cantly lower mark-up than the …rms in competitive
regions. Epple and Schäfer [1996] in turn look at the transition from pub-
lic monopoly to competition occurred in Germany after the implementation
of the third EU damage guideline. They …nd that premium rates increased
dramatically through this transition.
4A more general treatment of issues arising in housing insurance through-
out Europe can be found in von Ungern [2003].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the
economic problem we are interested in. Section 3 introduces the model and
its assumptions we will use in the empirical part of the paper. It also includes
tests whether these assumptions are con…rmed within the data set. In Section
4 we present in more detail the data at hand from the housing insurance
market in Switzerland. Section 5 presents the estimation techniques used and
the discussion of the results. Section 6 presents the results on the comparison
between the cost structure of public and private insurance providers. Section
7 concludes.
2 The economic problem
We wish to compare the coste¢ciency of public and private insurance providers
on the Swiss property insurance market. The structure of the market is as
follows: Housing insurance is compulsory for every building. In 19 of the
26 Swiss cantons there is a public state monopoly, the Cantonal Property
Insurance (CPI). In the remaining 7 Cantons there is no public supplier,
and the owners have to obtain cover from one of several private insurance
companies2.
A …rst rough comparison of the cost structure of the di¤erent types of
insurance can be found in Figure 1. Costs are expressed in cts per SFr. 1’000
housing stock insured (SI).
A …rst important point to note is that the private insurance companies
spend substantially more on administrative costs and commissions than their
public counterparts. (31 cts vs. 6 cts/SFr. 1’000 SI). This di¤erence is easy
to explain. The state monopolies have a very stable customer base (the
house owners of their canton) and they have no need to invest into customer
acquisition and advertising. This gives them a substantial cost advantage.
2Note that the CPI’s represent (as of 1990) more than 80% of housing insurance in
Switzerland, measured in terms of insured housing stock.
5Figure 1
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Second one notes that the Cantonal Property Insurances spend important
amounts on damage prevention. They devote roughly one quarter of their
premium income (14 cts/SFr. 1’000 SI) on such activities. This seems to us
an interesting application of the Coase theorem (Coase [1960]). The public
insurance companies bene…t directly from better prevention. They are thus
more likely to devote the necessary resources to such activities. The private
insurance companies spend only slightly more than the compulsory 5 cent
tax (Löschfünfer) on prevention. Finally one notes that the claims level of
the private insurance companies is substantially higher than the one for the
CPI. There is some debate in Switzerland, to what extent this di¤erence in
claims levels can be attributed to di¤erences in preventive measure.
Given these large cost di¤erences, it is not surprising, that the CPI can
work with much lower premium levels. For the period 1984-1995 the premium
di¤erence was of the order of 40%. Further, the premiums for the CPI have
fallen another 25% between 1995 and 1999. They are now at 46 cts / SFr.
61’000 SI. For the private insurance companies we have no comparable …gures,
but there is circumstantial evidence that their premium level has remained
roughly constant. The premium di¤erential is thus currently of the order of
55%.
3 The Model
The private insurance companies tend to interpret the numbers mentioned
above somewhat di¤erently. They would argue that the claims - premium
ratio (C/P ratio) of the private insurance companies is equal to 0.53 which
is almost the same as that for the CPI (0.52)3.
This comparison is probably biased, since it implicitly treats the consid-
erable expenses for preventive measures …nanced by the CPI in the same way
as expenditures on, say, advertising and commissions. One ignores the fact
that the purpose of preventive measures is to reduce damages. If one were to
subtract the expenses on prevention for both types of insurance, the claims
ratios would be 0.66 for the CPI and 0.57 for the private insurers, a di¤erence
of only about 15%. This raises the question, whether the C/P ratio is indeed
an adequate method of comparison.
The underlying assumption of the C/P ratio is that all the other cost
components of an insurance provider (in our case administrative costs, com-
missions and reserves) vary proportionately with the level of claims. This
need not necessarily be the case. We argued in the introduction, that there
are good reasons to believe that the elasticity of both administrative costs
and premiums should be less than one.
Whether this is in fact the case, is an empirical issue. To address this issue
we will study a panel data set for the 19 CPI for the time period 1981 to 1999.
However, we did not include the year 1999 in our estimation results, since
this year is considered to be an outlier (hurricane Lothar). We will analyze
how the level of administrative costs, gross premiums and net premiums (net
of prevention costs) vary with the level of claims. We will use the results we
obtain, to estimate administrative costs, gross premiums and net premiums
for a hypothetical CPI, which would have to work with the claims level
incurred by the private insurance providers. We shall compare the results
3Figures here and below correspond to average claims and premium rates over the
period 1984 to 1995.
7thus obtained with the cost di¤erential implied by the C/P ratio. We show
that the results obtained by the latter measure considerably underestimate
the “true” di¤erential obtained from our regression analysis.
The main econometric problem of this approach is the fact that the level
of damages in the property insurance market varies considerably from year
to year. There are good theoretical reason that the insurance companies’ ad-
ministrative costs and premium levels are more stable than claims payments.
Insurance companies will determine their administrative costs and premium
not on the basis of annual claims levels but of permanent or expected long
run claims levels. When regressing annual premiums or administrative costs
on annual claims levels in each of the 19 cantons, the slope coe¢cients are
not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in 35 out of 38 cases4.
We will therefore work with a model where the annual administrative
costs or (gross or net premium) income for a speci…c …rm is a function,
not of the annual claims level, but the “permanent” level of claims. In the
simplest form of a linear relationship, this can be expressed as follows:
yjit = ® + ¯x
¤
i + uit (1)
where yjit is the observed value of …rm i in year t for: j = 1 administra-
tive cost, j = 2 gross premium income and j = 3 net premium income. x¤
i
is its permanent level of claims and uit is the usual error term. The x¤
i’s are
unobserved by the econometrician, but known by the …rm when it determines
the size of its administrative sta¤ and related actions. The information avail-
able to the econometrician is in the form of annual observations on claims
payments. The yearly payments can be decomposed into the permanent level
of claims (x¤




i + vit (2)
We assume vit to be independent of both x¤
i and uit, and not serially
correlated. However, we do not specify explicit assumptions on the variance
4Using standard 5% levels of statistical signi…cance.
8of the measurement error, allowing for heteroskedasticity5.
If the true relationship between administrative costs or premium income
and the level of claims is given by (1), then an OLS regression based on:
yit = ® + ¯xit + "it (3)
will lead to a slope coe¢cient which is biased towards zero6. This well
knownresult comes fromthe fact thatthe combined error term("it = uit ¡ ¯vit)
is correlated with the regressor xit. The (multiplicative) bias can be expressed








which can be described as the noise-to-total-variance ratio.
An alternative to the above model is the use of time averages for each
…rm, i.e. estimating a model of the following sort:
yi = ® + ¯xi + "i (5)
where the variables are now time averages for each …rm i. Standard
regression delivers a better result in this case, but we still do not obtain a
consistent estimate. The bias in this case is given by:







Note that the estimates of all other parameters in such a model are biased
as well. We therefore need di¤erent estimation procedures in order to get
consistent estimates.
5We tested whether we can model the evolution of claims payments as in (2), regressing,
for each …rm, the annual claims on a constant and a time trend. We observed that for all
but two …rms the constant is signi…cant but the time trend is not. Breusch-Godfrey tests
on serial correlation (of order 2) did not indicate signs of serial correlation However, there
are strong indications that the variances of claims payments across …rms are di¤erent. A
test of equality of variances showed that 9 …rms had signi…cantly di¤erent variances from
the mean of the sample.
6This is often called attenuation.
7Described by ¾2
x¤ for the permanent level of claims and ¾2
v for the measurement error.
Note that the term ”second moment” is not completely correct here if x¤ is a …xed number,
in that case ¾2
x¤ is a constant.
9As was mentioned before, damage occurrences vary greatly across regions.
It is not only that the average claims level varies across CPI’s, but also
the variance of claims among the di¤erent CPI’s is not the same. Table 1
illustrates this fact. The average claims level for the rural canton Lucerne
is more than three times the one for the urban canton Zurich. Similarly,
the coe¢cient of variation of another rural canton, Glarus, is almost triple
compared to an urban area (Zurich). Figure 2 shows the evolution of claims
in the years 1981 to 1998 for the same areas.
Table 1
Summary Statistics of claims payments
(cts per SFr. 1’000 SI)
Canton Obs: Mean
Coeff:
V ar: Min Max
Lucerne 18 60:04 0:43 27:95 126:09
Glarus 18 38:9 0:57 11:92 89:87
Zurich 18 18:39 0:20 10:48 24:16
Figure 2

















































10We thus wish to introduce intoour model the fact that the “measurement”
error does not necessarily have the same variance across …rms. We denote
by ¾2
vi the variance in the measurement error of …rm i. Clearly, if we have
information on ¾2
vi, this information should be used, if we wish to obtain an
e¢cient estimator of the coe¢cients in the model. We will return to these
issues in Section 5.
4 The Data
We used a data set on 19 the CPI’s in Switzerland over the period 1981 to
1998. For each …rm the data available correspond to annual values of: insured
housing stock, claims paid (with a distinction between …re and elementary
damage), premium income prevention expenses and administrative costs. We
express costs and damages per SFr.1’000 insured.
This gives us the following de…nitions of the variables used:
² y1it premiums per SFr. 1’000 SI for …rm i in year t.
² y2it net premiums per SFr. 1’000 SI for …rm i in year t, expressed
as the di¤erence between premiums and prevention expenses.
² y3it administrative costs per SFr. 1’000 SI for …rm i in year t.
² xit claims paid per SFr. 1’000 SI for …rm i in year t.
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics of these variables. In Table
2 we present the disaggregated data in Table 3 the same data for the 19
(unweighted) cantonal averages. The mean premium income is about 70
cts / SFr. 1’000 SI. From the di¤erence between premium income and net
premium income we can infer that average spending on prevention is about
15.5 cts / SFr. 1’000 SI. Claims represent almost 50% of premium income,
whereas administrative costs a little over 10%.
11Table 2
Summary Statistics
(cts per SFr. 1’000 SI)
V ariable Obs: Mean
Std:
Dev: Min Max
Prem. (y1it) 342 70:29 17:12 27:66 109:88
Net Prem. (y2it) 342 54:59 18:63 6:56 95:25
Adm. Costs (y3it) 342 7:38 2:88 2:88 17:83
Claims (xit) 342 34:64 19:90 5:99 126:09
Table 3
Summary Statistics - Cantonal Averages
(cts per SFr. 1’000 SI)




Prem. (y1it) 19 70:29 0:12 39:29 95:61
Net Prem. (y2it) 19 54:59 0:20 29:70 84:30
Adm. Costs (y3it) 19 7:38 0:17 3:76 13:51
Claims (xit) 19 34:64 0:44 18:39 60:04
From Table 3 we can see that claims payments are more volatile than
premiums and administrative costs. Similarly, the coe¢cient of variation of
claims is more than three times higher than the one for premium income.
The coe¢cient of variation for claims is still more than double the ones for
net premium income and administrative costs.
5 Estimation & Results
We apply two di¤erent estimation techniques to our model: the standard
Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, and an alternative technique: Con-
sistent Adjusted Least Squares (CALS). Both techniques yield consistent
coe¢cient estimates and allow us to test to what extent the C/P ratio can
be used to assess e¢ciency of an insurance provider.
Both estimation procedures depart from OLS in that they use additional
elements for estimation. In the case of IV it is the use of instruments, whereas
in the case of CALS it is the variance of the measurement errors.
12Instrumental Variables (IV)
Instrumental Variables (IV) has become the most standard approach to
measurement error problems8. With suitable instruments it produces consis-
tent estimates. The drawback of the technique is that “good” instruments
are not always readily available, so the bene…t of getting a consistent result
is often obtained at the cost of an increased variance of the estimator.
As shown in Griliches and Hausman [1986], instruments are readily avail-
able in a panel data set. Given our assumptions, we can use, for every …rm
i, any observation at ¿ 6= t of the level of claims as an instrument for xit
9.







Further, to test for weak instruments, we performed a test as outlined in
Staiger and Stock [1997]. This test indicated strongly that our instruments
are not “weak”11.
Applying IV will produce a consistent estimator of the parameter val-
ues of our model. We further want to take into account heteroskedastic
errors in the regression. We do this in a similar way as using robust stan-
dard errors with OLS. Following Wansbeek and Meijer [2000], an alternative
IV-estimator, based on GMM can be applied in the case of heteroskedastic-
ity of unspeci…ed form. This estimator is based on IV and introduces the
adjustment for heteroskedasticity in a two-step estimation procedure. The
algebraic expression is:










8However, Malinvaud [1980] wrote: ”Thus, ..., we must …nd instrumental variables
which are uncorrelated with the errors a¤ecting the variables, but are strictly correlated
with the true values of these variables. In practice, these considerations are often con-
tradictory, and this greatly restricts the usefulness of the method”. (Emphasis from the
authors).
9Note that the existence of serial correlation in the form of MA(p) would allow to use
observations at time ¿ > t + p or ¿ < t ¡ p as valid instruments.
10We thank Mark Watson for suggesting this instrument. Note that we concentrate
the available information into one variable, thus reducing the number of instruments to a
minimum. However, formulating the instrument in this way does not allow for eventual
panel data estimator, since cor(xit;wit) = ¡1 by construction.
11The F-statistic for wit in a regression of xit on wit in our sample is 854, which is
considerably above a value of 10, proposed as a critical value for possibly weak instruments.
13where X and W are the matrix of regressors and instruments, respectively,
b ª" = diag[e2], and e2 = (y¡bIV x)2 is the squared error from the application
of IV. However, since in our case the number of instruments is the same
as the number of regressors, W0X is squared and the formula reduces to
the standard IV-estimator. Nevertheless, the estimated covariance matrix of
bIV ¡GMM is di¤erent and the estimator is asymptotically more e¢cient (see
Wansbeek and Meijer [2000] p. 120).
Consistent Adjusted Least Squares (CALS)
Consistent Adjusted Least Squares (CALS) is an alternative to IV es-
timation with some interesting features. It relies on the knowledge of the
variance of the measurement error, and will allow us to take into account ex-
plicitly di¤erences across …rms in the accuracy of the observed signal on the
permanent level of claims. This technique has been pioneered by Kapteyn
and Wansbeek [1984].
The technique is intuitive and can best be illustrated on the slope coef-
…cient (¯) of our model. OLS regression of (3) leads to biased results, as
shown above. The probability limit of the OLS estimator is given by:







We can see that, with knowledge of the variance of the measurement error
(¾2
v) one can obtain a consistent estimator based on OLS, which we denote
by bCALS
12:















it is the observed second moment of the level of
claims. Note that similar adjustments can be applied to all the other coe¢-
cients of the model, in our case to ®.
As mentioned before, we can extend this framework to allow for het-
eroskedastic measurement error. If the variance of the measurement error
(¾2
vi) is known, we can rewrite the true model in the following way:
e yi = e ® + ¯e x
¤
i + e ui (11)
12The asymptotic distribution of the estimator of the slope coe¢cient can be found in
Meijer & Wansbeek [2000].
14e xi = e x
¤
i + e vi (12)
Where e xi =
p
T
¾vixi and xi is the sample average over …rm i. The other
variables are de…ned analogously. Note that with this transformation we
have E[e v2
it] = 1, i.e. the measurement error variance is the same across …rms
and known . Joining (11) and (12) results in the equation to be estimated13:
e yi = e ® + ¯e xi +e "i (13)
where e "i = e ui ¡ ¯e vi is again the combined error term.
This model …ts again our measurement error framework as in (3), hence
we can apply the CALS framework here as well.
Note that although this estimator is consistent, there might be e¢ciency
considerations to take into account. The fact that the measurement error
variance is heteroskedastic translates into the combined error term e "i not
having a unique variance across observations, due to the transformation of
the equation error terms (ui). In future research, one could try to obtain
robust standard errors for inference.
In order to obtain a feasible version of the CALS estimator one needs a
consistent estimator of ¾2
v or ¾2
vi. We used as the estimator for ¾2
vi the sample
variance of …rm i, whereas the estimator for ¾2




Results for the premium-claims relationship
We …rst present the results concerning the model relating premium in-
come and claims payments. As we have argued before, prevention expenses
should not be considered like other cost components such as administrative
expenses and commissions. This is why we focused on the relation between
net premium and claims payments. It can be argued whether one should
include a time trend in the model, as there have been (steadily) important
13A similar model could be formulated using all the observations in our data set and
not just the …rm speci…c averages. However, the relevant information on x¤
i is contained
in the …rm speci…c averages. Using the yearly data, just introduces more noise. Results
using all observations revealed to be very sensitive to changes and therefore not reliable.
14Note that this estimator for ¾2
vi assumes x¤
i to be non-stochastic. Abul Naga [2000]
presents alternative estimators for stochastic x¤
i’s based on the variance of …rst di¤erences.
Using these alternative estimators for the measurement error variance only marginally
altered our results.
15reductions over time in premium income among the CPI. Including time in
the regressions alters the relevant parameters (® and ¯) only marginally. We
therefore opted to present results not including a time trend15.
In Table 4 we present the results for the di¤erent estimation techniques.
We performed OLS with average data (bAV E), CALS in the untransformed
(bCALS) and transformed model (e bCALS), using time averages for each CPI.
Further, we performed IV-GMM estimation on all observations. As an il-
lustration of the importance of the measurement error bias, we included the
results of performing OLS with all observations (bOLS). Appendix 1 presents























The table con…rms the expected results. OLS on all observations yields
a very low slope coe¢cient17 (b ¯), whereas the intercept concentrates most of
the explanation of the model. In fact, the intercept in the OLS model corre-
sponds to almost 75% of the sample mean of the independent variable (net
premium income). When using average data, the situation already changes
dramatically. The slope coe¢cient increases to a level above one and the in-
tercept drops to less than 30% of the sample mean of net premiums. We ob-
serve that as theory would suggest bAV E;though a better estimate still seems
15Results of the regressions including a time trend can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
16The number of observations are 19 for bAV E, bCALS and e bCALS. For bIV ¡GMM and
bOLS they are 342. Estimated standard errors are reported below the coe¢cient value. ¤
represents statistically signi…cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5% and ¤¤¤ at 1%.
17Note that the slope coe¢cient in the OLS model is about one third than the one
obtained using IV.
16to be biased. The three consistent estimators (bCALS, e bCALS and bIV ¡GMM)
show slope coe¢cients of roughly 1:3. Note that the OLS-adjustment on
the transformed model (e bCALS) leads to the highest slope coe¢cient and a
constant that represents merely 10% of the sample average of the indepen-
dent variable. Note that e bCALS and bIV ¡GMM have slope coe¢cients that are
statistically di¤erent from one at the 10% level. Finally, the results con…rm
our concern on heteroskedastic measurement error, in that e bCALS seems to
be more robust. It detects a signi…cant and theoretically justi…ed constant,
even though its value is the lowest among all the estimators.
Results for the administrative cost-claims relationship
In Table 5 we present the results for the administrative cost-claims pay-
ments relationship. We again used OLS with all data, OLS with average data
(bAV E), CALS in the untransformed (bCALS) and transformed model (e bCALS)
and IV-GMM estimation. The estimators of the measurement error variance























Again we observe that the slope coe¢cient in the OLS regression is very
low, this time the IV coe¢cient is about 5 times higher. Further, the inter-
cept here corresponds to almost 85% of the sample mean of the independent
variable. In the case of administrative costs we observe, as before, that using
average data might lead to biased results. Note that the results are very
similar to the ones obtained by von Ungern-Sternberg [1994] for a di¤erent
18The number of observations are 19 for bAV E, bCALS and e bCALS. For bIV ¡GMM and
bOLS they are 342. Estimated standard errors are reported below the coe¢cient value. ¤
represents statistically signi…cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5% and ¤¤¤ at 1%.
17time period. However, the results from the consistent estimators suggest that
there might still be considerable downward bias (in this case of around 20%)
of the slope coe¢cient using average data. The estimators using CALS or IV
present similar results with slope coe¢cients around 0:15 and the constant
represents about 30% of the sample mean of administrative costs. Regarding
statistical signi…cance, we can say that the slope coe¢cient is highly signi…-
cant for all estimation techniques, whereas the theoretically justi…ed constant
is only signi…cant using the instrumental variable technique.
We next turn to the comparison of our results on the CPI’s with the
private insurance providers.
6 Comparison with private insurance providers
In this section we shall use the results estimated above to extrapolate the
level of administrative costs and (net) premiums for a hypothetical CPI with
the level of damages of the private insurers. As was mentioned in Section 2,
data for the private insurance providers correspond to averages over all …rms
and cantons for the period 1984 to 199519. Table 6 below presents the results
of this exercise. We present comparisons using the estimation results of the
instrumental variables estimation and OLS with average data.
Table 6
Comparison with private insurance providers
cts / SFr. 1’000 SI
Comparison Net Premium Adm. Costs
Avg. of private 102:8 31:00
Avg. of CPI 49:59 6:10
Avg. claims of priv. 58:19 58:19
Avg. claims of CPI 32:90 32:90
Forecast (IV) 85:56 10:80
Forecast (AVE) 81:65 10:32
Di¤erence (IV) 20:15% 187:05%
Di¤erence (AVE) 25:91% 200:44%
19For reasons of comparability, we took the same period for the average values for the
CPI’s.
18Administrative Costs
The true administrative cost level of the CPI is equal to 6 cts / SFr. 1’000
SI. With the damage levels of the private insurers this would increase to
slightly more than 10 cts. Hence, only a small fraction of the total di¤erence
in administrative and sales costs can be explained by di¤erences in claims
levels. Of the initial di¤erence of 25 cts, more than 20 cts remain unexplained.
On this market state monopolies clearly lead to a substantial cost saving
for the customer. To understand what this cost saving means in absolute
numbers, note that the total stock of insured housing capital of the CPI’s in
1998 was of the order of 1’500 billion SFr. The saving in administrative and
sales cost of 20 cts thus represents a cost saving of around 300 million francs
per year.
Net premiums
We obtain similar results when comparing net premiums according to
Table 6. The hypothetical net premium rate of a CPI with the damage rate of
the private insurers is equal to 86 cts. This implies that the private insurance
providers are about 20% more expensive than a CPI would be with similar
claims levels. Note that the average damage rate of the three CPI with the
highest claims level (Lucerne, Jura and Nidwalden) is equal to 53 cts. This is
slightly more than the average of the private providers (50 cts). The average
net premium rate of these three CPI is equal to 80 cts as compared to 103
for the private providers. Our results are thus quite plausible.
The estimated di¤erence in net premium levels (103-86=17 cts) is thus
only marginally smaller than the di¤erence in costs savings (20 cts) computed
in the previous section. The missing 3 cts are due to the fact that cantons
with higher claims levels require more reserves than cantons with lower claims
levels.
Finally we can observe that the predicted C/P ratio for a CPI with the
claims rate of the private insurers is about 68%, whereas the e¤ective C/P
ratio for the private insurers is only 57%.
Note that it is not possible to perform comparisons for each canton where
housing insurance is o¤ered by private …rms. The private insurers have set up
a “pool” for elementary damage insurance. For this category of damage, they
charge the same premium rate across all cantons even though the e¤ective
risk exposition varies substantially. This is an important source of cross-
subsidies across cantons. An individual comparison of the cost e¢ciency by
canton is thus not warranted. No such pool exists among the CPI.
19Some remarks on damage prevention
The previous analysis was based on the implicit assumption that the
reductions in claims due to the higher prevention expenditures were no larger
than the preventive expenditures themselves. It is of course interesting to
test whether this is the case.
Ideally one would wish to specify an econometric model to estimate the
e¢ciency of expenditures on prevention. Unfortunately we do not have the
necessary data of such an exercise. An alternative approach would be to
compare the level of claims in two areas that are similar in most respects.
We did this for Geneva (private) and Lausanne (CPI).
According to data presented in Schips [1995], the average claims rate
for the period 1984 to 1993 in Geneva was 37 cts. The claims rate for the
urban area of Lausanne, which has approximately the same urban structure
as Geneva is equal to 21 cts. The di¤erence with Geneva is thus 37- 21 = 16
cts. Prevention expenses in the canton Geneva are of the order of 6 cts, in
Lausanne they are 13 cts. The di¤erence is thus 7 cts.
The di¤erence in prevention expenditures 7 cts is considerably lower than
the di¤erence in the claims 16 cts. These numbers would suggest that the re-
duction in claims due to better prevention exceeds the increase in prevention
expenditures by 16-7 = 9 cts.
In view of these observations it seems fair to assume, that the reduction
in damages is probably much larger than the simple di¤erence in preven-
tive expenditures suggests. The comparisons above are thus most probably
heavily biased against the CPI’s.
7 Conclusions
We set out to compare the cost e¢ciency of public and private property
insurance providers in Switzerland. The public providers (CPI) work with
premium rates that are approximately 60% of the ones from private insurers.
However, private insurers show claims payments that are almost double the
ones observed for the CPI. This implies that the commonly used Claims /
Premium ratio is virtually identical between public and private providers.
One could therefore argue that, given the similarity in the claims - premium
ratio, there is no case for di¤erences in cost e¢ciency.
20We argue that the use of the Claims / Premium ratio can lead to strongly
biased results. First, one can observe that the CPI spend considerably higher
amounts on prevention than do their private counterparts. These expenses
cannot be considered as simple cost components, such as administrative costs
and commissions, since they lead to lower damage rates. Working with net
(of prevention) premium income is thus more adequate. Further, in order
to use the Claims / Premium ratio, one assumes that the elasticity between
claims payments and premium income is equal to one. However, there are
sound theoretical reasons to believe that this elasticity is in fact less than
one. Administrative costs and commissions, as a component of the premium,
can be divided conceptually into two parts; one which is independent of the
claims level (e.g. the acquisition of new customers), and one which depends
on the claims level (e.g. settling claims). Hence, when regressing premium
income on claims payments, one would expect a positive intercept.
In order to test these issues, we use a simple model of a linear relation-
ship between premium income (or administrative costs and commissions) and
claims. We assume (and the data con…rm) that premium rates are a func-
tion of the “normal” or “permanent” level of claims. This implies …rst that
premium income (or administrative costs) varies much less over time than do
claims, and second that annual observations on claims payments are a noisy
signal of the true underlying “permanent” variable.
This setup …ts a measurement error framework, and we can use techniques
that deal with this issue. An additional feature we include in our model, is
the fact that the noisiness of the signal is di¤erent across …rms, i.e. the
measurement errors are heteroskedastic.
We estimate our model using a data set of the 19 CPI in Switzerland
over the period 1981 to 1998. We focus on the relationship between net
premium income and claims payments and administrative costs and claims
payments, using instrumental variables (IV) and consistent adjusted least
squares (CALS) estimation procedures.
We …nd that measurement error bias is an important issue in our data set,
even when using average data for each …rm. Further, the results indicate that
the elasticity between claims payments and premium income is less than one.
For net premium income we obtain a coe¢cient on claims payments of around
1:3, whereas the constant represents around 10% of the sample average. In
the case of administrative costs, we obtain a coe¢cient on claims payments
of 0:15, and a constant representing about 30% of the sample average.
21We next performed an extrapolation of our estimation results for an hy-
pothetical CPI with a level of damages of the private insurers. This allows to
compare the estimated administrative costs and net premium levels with the
e¤ectively observed ones for the private …rms. We …nd that private property
insurance providers in Switzerland are about 20% more expensive than a CPI
with similar damage levels would be. In the case of administrative costs, the
data show that the private providers spend around 20 cts per SFr. 1’000 of
sum insured than do the CPI’s. Only 4 cts of these 20 cts can be explained
with di¤erences in the claims level. Given the insured stock of housing capi-
tal in the cantons with CPI’s this implies annual cost savings of around 300
million francs per year.
Finally, it should be noted that the above results implicitly assume that
prevention expenditures do not lead to reductions in claims payments that
are higher than the former. A comparison between two similar areas, Geneva
(private) and Lausanne (CPI), we see that there is a di¤erence of 16 cts in
the claims rates, whereas the di¤erence in the prevention rates is only 7 cts.
This suggests that the reductions in damage are probably larger than the
di¤erential in prevention expenditures. This suggests that our comparisons
are strongly biased against the CPI’s.
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23Appendix 1
Results of Estimation
( gross premium-claims relationship20)

























20The number of observations are 19 for bAV E, bCALS and e bCALS. For bIV , bIV ¡GMM
and bOLS they are 342. Estimated standard errors are reported below the coe¢cient
value. ¤ represents statistically signi…cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5% and ¤¤¤ at 1%. The number
of observations is 342 in all estimations.
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